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Abstract
Objectives: During the last few years, wireless networks have
been increasingly used both inside hospitals and in patients’ homes
to transmit medical information. In general, wireless networks
suffer from decreased security. However, digital watermarking can
be used to secure medical information. In this study, we focused on
combining wireless transmission and digital watermarking tech-
nologies to better secure the transmission of medical images within
and outside the hospital. Methods: We utilized an integrated
system comprising the wireless network and the digital water-
marking module to conduct a series of tests. Results: The test
results were evaluated by medical consultants. They concluded that
the images suffered no visible quality degradation and maintained
their diagnostic integrity. Discussion: The proposed integrated
system presented reasonable stability, and its performance was
comparable to that of a fixed network. This system can enhance
security during the transmission of medical images through a
wireless channel.
Key words: encryption, wireless telemedicine, image transfer, digital
watermarking
Introduction
A
s the technologies grow, wired networks are increasingly
being replaced by their wireless counterparts, leaving the
wired infrastructure to serve only as a backbone. People
value their mobility and all the emerging applications that
provide them with the ability to freely move around. The medical
world is no exception: an increasing number of medical applications
rely on the treating physician and=or the patient using wireless
means to deliver or acquire medical information. Wireless networks
are the status quo in modern hospitals and have helped speed up
procedures, deliver medical expertise, and manage time and space
much more efficiently.1
Unfortunately, nothing good comes without a price: an increasing
concern has been raised lately about the security of wireless net-
works. Both patients and physicians feel that since the range of the
network is not fixed, anyone outside the hospital’s grounds can gain
access to the network and tamper with the data sent. Understandably,
this is a grim scenario because such an action may have a severe
impact on the patients’ lives and their privacy.2
The wireless networks industry suggested various ways of en-
crypting data sent in a wireless channel and also controlling the user
access in that channel. These included Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP),3 Wi-Fi Protected Access, use of RADIUS servers, and IPSec,
with WEP being the simplest and most commonly used method of
encryption.4 There are, however, increasingly publicized concerns
about the effectiveness of the above-mentioned algorithms and es-
pecially that of WEP, the industry’s default wireless security stan-
dard.5 Exploiting vulnerabilities in the implementation of the security
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algorithms or even performing brute force attacks can lead to an
intruder taking control of the channel and compromising security.
In addition, wireless networks present a number of drawbacks,
such as quality of service as compared with other means of electronic
communication (namely, utilizing the fixed infrastructure), increased
packet loss, increased latency, and jitter. Nevertheless, it is not the
purpose of this article to go into depth regarding these issues, as they
have been analyzed in other network-oriented and non-healthcare-
oriented publications.
In this context, there is a critical need to resort to complementary
measures to effectively address increasing security threats in the
healthcare sector. Digital watermarking is a promising research area
that can be exploited toward this direction. Among its numerous
applications, ranging from copyright protection to integrity control,
its value-added role in healthcare systems only recently started to be
realized.6–8 Digital watermarking involves insertion of additional
information directly into the data; from a healthcare perspective, this
attribute can be explored by means of inserting (1) patient’s sensitive
information into his=her examination data for increased security, (2)
physician’s and=or medical device identification number for au-
thentication, (3) keywords (e.g., patient’s unique identifier and ex-
amination or diagnostic codes) for efficient data indexing, archiving,
and retrieval, and (4) control arrays for integrity check.9
In this context, it would make sense to introduce an integrated
system that would be able to combine the security strengths of digital
watermarking with the ease of use of wireless networks in medical
scenarios. Such a system should be easy to use by both medical
personnel and patients, secure enough to transfer vital medical in-
formation, integratable into standard pieces of software, and ex-
pandable to accommodate future needs and developments. This
article presents a compact and integrated system that helps to ensure
the safe transmission and receipt of medical images in a hospital
environment that is run under wireless links. This has been achieved
by combining the current wireless networking security (WEP) with an
additional level of security provided by digital watermarking. As far
as the authors are aware of, the concept of using digital watermarking
as a complementary security solution in this context is still in its
infancy, and its implementation in an integrated WEP-based security
system has not yet been realized.
Methods
The suggested system essentially comprises two different units
that are eventually combined together: (1) the wireless network that
is partially secured using WEP encryption, and (2) the digital wa-
termarking module that provides an additional level of security by
enabling the insertion of patient=examination-specific information
directly into the image, as well as the verification of the integrity of
the image itself.
WIRELESS NETWORK
A wireless network consisting of two access points (APs) was es-
tablished at the Central Middlesex Hospital in London, to cover both
the majors and minors accidents and emergency (A&E) wards. Much
like in any cellular configuration the power of the APs was adjusted
so that the range of each partially overlapped the range of its
neighboring one to provide roaming capabilities for the mobile cli-
ent. Figure 1 shows the intersection of the range of the two APs
within the majors and minors A&E wards of the hospital. Each of the
APs created an area of about 100–150m2 with a third of that over-
lapping with the area of the next cell. Both IEEE 802.11b and g
technologies were used, which operate at the license-free band of
2.4 GHz; 802.11b achieved slightly better coverage at the expense of
lower speed (802.11g and b had a practical top speed of 18 and
4 Mbps, respectively).
To facilitate the wireless transmission of medical images within
the medical environment, a mobile trolley that could easily roam
around the A&E area was utilized, incorporating all the necessary
hardware that would be used during the experiments. A lightweight
laptop, connected with a high-quality camcorder, which in turn had
the ability to connect to a variety of other medical equipment around
the A&E area through their video-out connectors, was mounted on a
light trolley, and by having been connected to the WLAN, it was
considered a part of the hospital’s network.2
For compatibility purposes, WEP, being the default 802.11b=g
encryption, was utilized. WEP supports 48-, 64-, or 128-bit en-
cryption key. Unfortunately, owing to the implementation of its
security algorithm (RC4), the overall security is compromised: im-
proper use of the initialization vectors leaks out information about
the key regardless of its length. An attacker can calculate the key by
gathering and analyzing a sufficient number of packets. Using an
128-bit key would only linearly extend the attacking period, which
nowadays takes no longer than 15–30min, according to the dis-
tance of the attacker from the AP.3 Using the above-mentioned
trolley, the treating doctor could use any of the system’s input
(camera, video-in, etc.) to capture high-quality medical images, and
apply the watermarking sequence before the image is transmitted
through the wireless channel. The image would normally be directly
transmitted to another site—in most cases a site where a medical
consultant resides. As proof of concept, the authors utilized the
high-quality camcorder to capture the dermatological images,
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whereas the other modalities were retrieved from the laptop’s hard
drive. Nevertheless, the same procedure was applicable for these
modalities as well.
DIGITAL WATERMARKING MODULE
A digital watermarking software development kit was used to
implement the digital watermarking module running at the roaming
system within the A&E.10 The underlying algorithm of the software
development kit that was used applies discrete cosine transform for
watermark embedding and is block based. The implemented digital
watermarking module has a twofold role: on the one hand, it allows
embedding of additional data regarding
the patient, the examination, and the
like, directly into the image; on the
other hand, it enables verification of
the image itself. As far as verification is
concerned, the digital watermarking
module generates an image-specific
authentication code, which is embed-
ded along with the additional patient’s
personal and examination data into the
image during the embedding proce-
dure. This authentication code may
include a secure hash value or alter-
natively a digital signature, as well as a
time-stamp, and is retrieved at the
watermark extraction site for image
verification. In addition, for security
reasons, a secret key string is used
during both watermark embedding and
extraction, to allow for the retrieval of
the embedded information by autho-
rized users only.
During the customization of the
watermarking module for the tests de-
scribed in this article, the graphical user
interface (GUI) was set to enable em-
bedding of the following sequence of
data in each image: (1) patient’s first
and last name, father’s name, date of
birth, and residence (street, munic-
ipality, city, and country), (2) image
modality, (3) image time-stamp, (4)
institute=clinic, and (5) general com-
ments. As will be discussed in more
detail in the Results section, the minimum number of characters that
were embedded in each image in our trials was 160, which was the
sum of all fields excluding the general comments. The maximum
length of watermarks embedded was 2,000 characters, and there were
also two intermediate embedding sequence lengths of 480 and 960
characters, respectively.
The GUI was utilized to embed the four different character se-
quences (160, 480, 960, and 2,000 characters) in sets of images of
six different modalities, comprising computed tomography (CT),
magnetic resonance angiography (MRA), magnetic resonance imag-
ing (MRI), dermatological, radiological, and ultrasound images. Each
Fig. 1. Ground plan of the accidents and emergency (A&E) wards of the Central Middlesex
Hospital indicating the intersection of the range of the two wireless access points.
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set included 5 images, thus reaching a total of 120 watermarked im-
ages for the evaluation phase. Regarding the acquisition of the
aforementioned images, the high-quality camcorder, which was
connected to the system, was utilized to capture the dermatological
images, whereas the remaining images were retrieved from existing
medical databases and were transferred to the system through a
storage device. Three different image formats ( JPEG, BMP, and TIF)
were utilized for testing; however, the watermarking procedure is
applicable to other formats as well, for example, to DICOM images,
because the watermarking algorithm is applied only on the image
pixels, not on the DICOM header, which is left intact by the whole
process. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to go into detail
about watermarking in DICOM images, it is noteworthy to mention
that as far as DICOM images are concerned, watermarking can be
exploited as follows: patient’s sensitive data, for example, demo-
graphics, which are commonly included in the DICOM header, could
instead be inserted as watermarks directly into the image; this would
enhance security and would additionally provide a permanent link
between the patient and the medical data, thus eliminating the risk of
losing their association after a format change.6–8
After the transmission of the watermarked image and its reception
at the consultant’s site, the consultant utilizes the same GUI and
inserts the secret key string to extract both the data and the au-
thentication code for image verification (Fig. 2). Three different
outcomes are possible:
1. In case the secret key string is different from the one utilized
during the embedding procedure, regardless of whether the
authentication code could be successfully compared, the GUI
returns an error message warning about the difference between
the two key strings and prompts the user to insert the correct
key string. In this case, the embedded information cannot be
extracted until the correct key string is inserted.
2. In case the secret key string is correct and the authentication
code is successfully compared, the extraction of the inserted
data is also successful and the consultant gains access to them.
3. In case the secret key string is correct but the authentication
procedure fails, the GUI informs the consultant that the image
has been tampered with. In this case, the string sequence that
was originally inserted cannot be extracted, and the GUI re-
turns an error message providing the coordinates of the
modified parts of the image.
A critical issue as far as watermarked images are concerned, es-
pecially in the case of medical images, is the evaluation of the image
quality after watermarking. It is a common practice to use metrics
such as peak signal–to–noise ratio (PSNR) to provide a numerical
evaluation of the image quality after watermarking. For more com-
pleteness, we selected to calculate both PSNR and weighted PSNR
(wPSNR) of the watermarked images; the latter is a quality metric that
assigns varying weights to the perceptually different image regions,
based on the noise visibility function (NVF), which reflects the
masking properties of the human visual system.6 The PSNR is mea-
sured in decibels and is defined as follows:
PSNR (I , I^ )¼ 10 log10
max I (m, n)
8(m, n)
" #2
[1=NI ]
P
8(m, n) I^ (m, n) I (m, n)
 2
0
BBBBB@
1
CCCCCA,
where I and I^ are the original and watermarked images, respec-
tively, NI is the number of pixels in the image, and max I (m, n)
8(m, n)
is the
maximum gray value of the original image. The denominator of the
PSNR is the average sample mean squared error.
As mentioned above, the wPSNR is a quality metric that assigns
different weights to the perceptually different image regions, based
on the NVF. The NVF reflects the masking properties of the human
visual system using a Gaussian model to estimate how much texture
exists in any area of the image. For flat regions, the NVF value is close
to 1, whereas for edge or textured regions, it is close to 0. The wPSNR
is also measured in decibels and is defined as follows:
Fig. 2. Combining Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) encryption
with digital watermarking to enhance security in wireless medical
image transmission.
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0
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where NVF(m, n) is the NVF value corresponding to the pixel
(m, n), and the other variables are defined as in the PSNR formula.
Especially in the case of medical images being subjected to wa-
termarking, it must be ensured that the watermarking process does
not induce any degradation to them that would result in loss of
diagnostic information and thus in the risk of misdiagnosis. There-
fore, apart from addressing the issue of image quality evaluation
based on the above-mentioned quality metrics, the watermarked
images need to be evaluated by physicians as well. In the context of
the work presented in this article, a blind review process took place;
namely, two radiologists were provided with both the original and
the watermarked images, without knowing which of them were the
original ones, and were asked to evaluate their diagnostic informa-
tion. The radiologists viewed the images in two ways before pro-
ceeding with their evaluation: for eachmedical modality test set, they
first viewed the corresponding images, that is, the original images
and the ones conveying watermarks of different sizes, individually,
sequentially, and in a random order; then, they viewed them side by
Table 1. Wireless Transmission Results of the Tested Medical Modalities
MODALITY
IMAGE
DIMENSIONS
(PIXELS) AVERAGE SIZE (KB) IMAGE FORMAT
TIME REQUIRED
(AT 11MBPS) (S)
TIME REQUIRED
(AT 54MBPS) (S)
ERRONEOUS
PACKETS THAT
NEEDED
RETRANSMISSION
(AVERAGE VALUE)
(%)
CT 512· 512 186 TIF 0.5 0.1 0.3
Dermatological 2,592· 1,944 501 JPG 1.3 0.2 1.3
MRA 512· 512 258 BMP 0.7 0.1 0.8
MRI 512· 512 258 BMP 0.7 0.1 0.5
Radiological 500· 640 314 BMP 0.7 0.2 0.6
Ultrasound 256· 320 81 TIF 0.2 0.1 0.1
CT, computed tomography; MRI, magnetic resonance imaging; MRA, magnetic resonance angiography.
Fig. 3. (a) Original computed tomography test image.
(b) Watermarked computed tomography test image.
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side on flat-panel, 20-inch LCD monitors, with a resolution equal to
1,600 · 1,200. They were asked to report whether they were able to
notice any difference among them, which would mean different di-
agnostic findings, or whether they would extract the same diagnosis
regardless of the image that it would be based on. Given that the
radiologists did not know which the original images were, they
overcame the possibility of biased evaluation.
To test the integrity control capability of the watermarking
module, we deliberately altered one image from each modality,
namely, six images in total, after the watermarking procedure and
before sending them to a consultant. The alterations were made using
Photoshop and consisted of either blurring areas of the images (i.e., in
the cases of MRI and ultrasound images) or painting areas of the
images (i.e., in the cases of CT, dermatological, MRA, and radiological
images). Those areas were deliberately very small in order not to be
perceived by the human eye.
Results
In this research, we tested the hypothesis of further securing a
WEP-enabled wireless network by adding digital watermarking in the
medical data that it transmits through the air. For the first part of it,
our tests showed that the established wireless network behaved very
efficiently; the entire A&E ward was covered by two APs, and the
mobile client, that is, the wireless trolley, could roam around that
area without losing the connection. The system was tested for 7 days
and a total of 50 h. It performed more than 35 handovers to the
neighboring cell (roaming). It was also tested for real-time applica-
tions like carrying live streams (audio or video) or performing
Table 2. Average Peak Signal–to–Noise Ratio Values of the Watermarked Images for Each Tested Modality
PSNR (DB)
MODALITY 160 CHARS 480 CHARS 960 CHARS 2000 CHARS
CT 67.09 – 0.04 63.37 – 0.02 60.63 – 0.01 57.78 – 0.01
Dermatological 64.76 – 0.30 60.41 – 0.29 57.51 – 0.37 54.56 – 0.40
MRA 71.83 – 0.07 68.15 – 0.10 65.51 – 0.11 62.47 – 0.11
MRI 71.98 – 0.10 68.15 – 0.06 65.38 – 0.05 62.32 – 0.04
Radiological 72.64 – 0.09 68.98 – 0.08 66.27 – 0.08 63.24 – 0.10
Ultrasound 62.54 – 0.03 58.48 – 0.06 55.69 – 0.07 52.78 – 0.08
PSNR, peak signal–to–noise ratio; chars, characters.
Table 3. Average Weighted Peak Signal–to–Noise Ratio Values of the Watermarked Images for Each Tested Modality
WPSNR (DB)
MODALITY 160 CHARS 480 CHARS 960 CHARS 2000 CHARS
CT 82.14 – 0.05 78.31 – 0.02 75.31 – 0.03 72.03 – 0.04
Dermatological 72.47 – 0.75 68.08 – 0.46 65.23 – 0.48 62.47 – 0.50
MRA 86.98 – 0.13 83.23 – 0.03 80.52 – 0.15 77.30 – 0.29
MRI 87.13 – 0.09 83.25 – 0.06 80.35 – 0.07 77.09 – 0.05
Radiological 87.79 – 0.06 84.06 – 0.11 81.29 – 0.18 78.12 – 0.29
Ultrasound 77.42 – 0.16 72.93 – 0.37 69.53 – 0.58 65.72 – 0.87
wPSNR, weighted peak signal–to–noise ratio.
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videoconferencing with an average required bandwidth of 400–
500 kbps. While handing over from one AP to another, a small 1–4 s
gap was introduced to the channel. Transmission control protocol=
Internet protocol was used for image transfer; since transmission
control protocol=Internet protocol guarantees reliable transmission,
any kind of noise in the wireless channel that affected transmitted
packets resulted in their retransmission, thus increasing the band-
width occupied and=or the time to successfully send the file. Table 1
summarizes the transmission times along with the average number of
errors=packet retransmissions.
WEP use had negligible effect on the bandwidth occupied and on
the number of erroneous packets. Even though the theoretical
maximum transmission rates of IEEE 802.11b and IEEE 802.11g are
much higher, during the testing activities the actual achieved max-
imum usable bandwidth was 3.8 and 18.2 Mbps, respectively. Finally,
WEP cracking tools were used to test the vulnerability of the system.
These tools took advantage of the weaknesses of WEP encryption and
revealed the key in a matter of a few tens of minutes.
For the second part of the security solution, the digital water-
marking module was utilized to embed four watermarks of different
lengths, namely, 160, 480, 960, and 2,000 characters, in sets of im-
ages of six different modalities; each set consisted of five images,
reaching a total of 120 watermarked images that were all transmitted
and used for the evaluation phase. The modalities tested included CT,
MRA, MRI, dermatological, radiological, and ultrasound images. The
dimensions, format, and size of the tested images of each medical
modality are presented in Table 1.
Figure 3 shows an original CT image and the resulting water-
marked image, after the embedding of 2,000 characters. As illustrated
in Figure 3, the watermarking procedure caused no visible degra-
dation of the images, thus preserving their diagnostic significance.
Tables 2 and 3 present the average PSNR and wPSNR values obtained
for each of the tested medical image modalities, respectively. As can
be seen in these tables, the resulting PSNR and wPSNR values are
high, thus indicating the negligible image distortion induced due to
watermarking, in terms of numerical values.
Notwithstanding, such metrics cannot fully reflect the image
degradation as it is perceived by the human eye; therefore, additional
evaluation is needed. Particularly in the case of medical images, the
most trustworthy results regarding perceptual quality can be ob-
tained based on image evaluation conducted by medical experts, as
mentioned above. For this reason, two radiologists from the A&E
department of the North West London Hospitals were asked to
evaluate the resulting watermarked images compared to the original
ones, in terms of perceptual and diagnostic quality, following the
evaluation approach described in the Methods section. According to
the radiologists, no difference between the watermarked and the
original images could be noticed in any of the images, thus avoiding
any compromise on the quality of diagnostically significant parts. In
general, as the size of the embedded information increases, the image
is modified in a larger extent, thus resulting in larger degradation in
quality; however, the evaluating radiologists did not notice any
Fig. 4. (a) Watermarked magnetic resonance imaging test image.
(b) The watermarking algorithm identified the part of the water-
marked image (a) that was tampered with. The rectangle indicates
the area of the original MRI test image (a) that was altered.
GIAKOUMAKI ET AL.
312 TELEMEDICINE and e-HEALTH APRIL 2010
difference even in the case of the maximum amount of additional
information embedded (i.e., 2,000 characters), illustrating the effi-
ciency of the addressed methodology.
As mentioned, the authors deliberately altered various images
after the watermarking procedure and before sending them to a
consultant, to test the integrity control capability of the water-
marking module. In those cases, the authentication procedure failed
and the GUI informed the consultant that the image had been tam-
pered with; the string sequences that had been originally inserted
could not be extracted, and the GUI returned an error message pro-
viding the coordinates of the modified parts of each of the distorted
images. The result of such a case is graphically illustrated in Figure
4b, where the area of the original MRI test image (Fig. 4a) that was
altered is pointed out with a rectangle.
Discussion
Regarding the wireless transmission, the proposed integrated
system presented reasonable stability and its performance was
comparable to that of a wired network. This system is capable of
enhancing the security during the transmission of medical images
through a wireless channel, in two ways: initially by using the default
IEEE 802.11 security, WEP, and additionally by watermarking the
medical images before transmitting them through the wireless
channel. The integration of the watermarking functionality in a
wireless network not only allows for additional information to be
embedded in the patient’s image, but also enables the receiving end to
identify both whether the image has been tampered and whether the
source of the image is an authenticated one. The proposed system is
modular and easy to use: a GUI interface accepts two inputs, that is,
image and data, and incorporates them into the wireless stream. The
results of the tests showed the efficiency of the system in terms of
both performance and image quality preservation. Future work in-
volves large-scale tests of the proposed approach, using bigger and
more representative data sets of different medical modalities com-
monly used in clinical practice. Further, more extended blind studies
should take place regarding the radiologists’ ability to reach an ac-
curate diagnosis regardless of the watermarking process, before such
an approach could be adopted in a clinical environment. Further
clinical tests regarding user acceptability are also needed to have a
more complete feedback by nonexpert users of the system.
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